WHAT do we mean by consciousness? It is a quality which those states, which we call conscious states, have in common, but there is no reason to suppose that it exists independently of them. There is no such thing as consciousness apart from conscious states, any more than there is redness apart from red objects. My object in this Address is to try in part to answer the question: what is happening in the nervous system when we are experiencing a conscious state?
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Local Sign in Sensation Let us begin by considering what is involved in the simplest possible experience of a bodily sensation, a touch, let us say, on one big toe. It is generally agreed among neurophysiologists that although impulses in the afferent nerves differ somewhat in their rates of conduction there is no substantial difference between them corresponding to differences of sensory quality. It is unlikely, therefore, that it is the character of the electrical impulse in the afferent nerves which tells us that we are being touched, and there is certainly nothing toe-like in the afferent impulses carried by the pathways conducting the sensations of touch from the toe which tells us that it is the toe which is being touched. The anatomist may be able to identify the toe area by tracing pathways of degeneration, the physiologist by detecting the response of the cortex to peripheral stimulation, but this is information derived from the outside. The clinician and pathologist observe that a lesion in a certain area of the sensory cortex causes a loss of feeling in the toe, but this does not explain why it should be so. If we imagine the nervous pathways from the toe to the cortex completely isolated from the rest of the nervous system, it is clear that they could by themselves convey no localizing information, for how could electrical impulses exactly like those going to all the other cortical sensory areas mean that something is happening to the toe? This surely provides a clue to the answer, which is that we can localize touch only by perceiving it in relation to a representation of the body as a whole-whether in the form of unconscious schema or fully conscious image is unimportant for our present purposeand this body-schema maps out, as it were in a set of co-ordinates, all the possible voluntary actions which we should need to take in order to remove the stimulus either with the other foot or with either hand, or in any other way.
This process of localization of touch is a cortical function, but if I am right in thinking that it relates the touch felt to the body-image as a whole, it must involve pathways far more extensive than the primary sensory areas for touch in the cortex. When, therefore, the cortical area corresponding to one great toe is excited by the arrival there of an afferent impulse resulting from stimulation of the toe itself, such JAN.-NEuROL. 1. excitation must cause a widespread irradiation of impulses linking the toe area with the parieto-occipital areas which are concerned with awareness of the body-image, not only in the same cerebral hemisphere but by way of the corpus callosum with the corresponding area on the opposite side of the brain. The same thing must happen if the cortical sensory area is excited by an epileptic discharge or by an attack of migraine. And this, I take it, was what Hughlings Jackson (1931) meant when he said: "I must submit that the units making up that division of the highest centres which I call the anatomical substrata of subject-consciousness represent (properly rerepresent) all parts of the body, mainly sensorily, in relation to one another." And again, speaking of a prick on the back, "physically, the nervous impulses starting from a point on the periphery pricked 'travel' to units of the highest centres universally representing, and not to units representing one part of the back only.... In general the anatomical substrata of subject-consciousness are centres of universal coordination, or, as we said, they are unifying or synthesizing centres". Hence, when we speak of a part of the body as being represented for purposes of sensation at a certain point in the postcentral convolution on the opposite side, we do not mean that the consciousness of a part of the body is in some way localized there but that the cortical area in question constitutes a nodal point at which the sensory impulses coming from a particular part of the body are brought into relation with the whole body-image by means of pathways which must ramify widely throughout the posterior halves of both cerebral hemispheres to reach Jackson's division of the highest centres, the "anatomical substrata of subject-consciousness" rerepresenting all parts of the body in relation to one another.
So far reflection takes us. Is there any physiological evidence in favour of such a view? Adrian (1940 Adrian ( , 1941 and Woolsey and his collaborators (Woolsey and Fairman, 1946; Woolsey, 1947) by using electrocorticography to map the responses to sensory stimulation have demonstrated the existence of two cortical sensory areas in each hemisphere, which they call somatic areas 1 and 2. Area 1 which appears to correspond to the postcentral cortex in man is strictly contralateral in its representation except for a bilateral representation of the face area. Area 2 represents both sides of the body, but the contralateral twice as much as the ipsilateral. French, Sugar and Chusid (1947) have shown that area 2 has connexions with the pre-and post-central areas of the same and the opposite hemisphere. We do not yet know the function of the somatic area 2 but it is tempting to believe that it is concerned with the relation of primary sensory stimuli to the body-schema.
Imagery[and Memory
A good deal has been written recently about the disorders or the body-image itself and the main facts are now generally known. The most bizarre of these is the failure to attend to, or in extreme cases even to recognize as part of the body, the limbs on the left side as a result of a lesion in the right parieto-occipital region. There is one important conclusion which can be drawn from cases of this kind, viz. that the lesion in such cases has destroyed not only the patient's present awareness of his body-image but also neurones which are essential to his ability to remember that he ever possessed a left half of the body. If this is a true interpretation it would seem that the process of remembering the body-image involves an activation of the same neurones as are concerned in its current awareness.
What happens in the brain when we exercise visual imagination, when we create a visual image of some past event or even of something purely imaginary? Electroencephalography provides a clue in the fact that the exercise of the imagination interferes with the alpha rhythm which is regarded as indicating a state of rest in the visual cortex.
It sometimes happens that as a result of a lesion of the brain a patient loses all visual imagery, which can no longer be evoked voluntarily and ceases to occur spontaneously. This condition has also been called loss of revisualization (Nielsen, 1946) .
Nielsen states that the lesion responsible for loss of revisualization involves Brodmann's area 19. Pitts and McCulloch (1947) say that during stimulation of a single spot in area 18 "human patients report perceiving complete and well-defined objects, but without definite size or position, much as in ordinary visual mental imagery" (see also Bonin, Garol and McCulloch, 1942) . We do not yet know enough about the functions of the parastriate region to be dogmatic, but there is evidence which suggests that visual imagery may depend upon the integrity of that part of the brain.
Whether the image is, as it were, displayed upon the visual cortex or utilizes a secondary visual area we do not yet know.
Penfield's (1947) observation that it was possible to evoke in a patient an elaborate visual picture of a remembered scene by electrical stimulation of the temporal lobe takes us a step further towards the anatomy of memory. So we seem led to picture the anatomical basis of memory, so far as it involves images, as innervating widespread areas of the cortex, including in all probability the relevant primary sensory areas. Dreaming must involve in part the same pathways. Clearly it would be quite erroneous to picture either memories or images as "stored" in some area of the brain. We should think rather of a widespread neural network which can be set vibrating in an almost infinite variety of patterns in space and time.
Consciousness and Patterns
One of the most fundamental properties of the brain is that which renders possible the recognition of patterns. The biological importance of this is obvious on a little reflection. Objects of the same kind differ among themselves. Cats, for example, are not all alike. Survival, however, often depends upon the ability of the organism to react to all objects of a class in the same way. Clearly it would be impossible for the nervous system to be so organized that the appropriate reaction should be directly linked with each group of stimuli representing each of the various individuals of a given class. The organization required would be too complex. Such reactions could not be innate nor could they be learned by experience, because each fresh individual member of the group would constitute a new group of stimuli, the reaction to which had not previously been learned. If a mouse is to succeed in recognizing and reacting appropriately towards a cat it must do so the first time or not at all, and it cannot afford to make the mistake of recognizing black cats as cats but not white ones. The nervous system has solved this problem in what would seem to be the only possible way: it has introduced plasticity into the receptive side so that what the animal reacts to is not a mosaic of all the individual features of the object perceived, but a pattern which constitutes an abstraction from any particular individual, but for that very reason is common to all individuals of the group. Thus, for example, a rat can be trained to recognize, in the sense of reacting in a trained manner to, triangles as distinct from other geometrical figures.
In this connexion pattern is a general term of wide application and it usually stands for something much more complex than the instances which we have just considered. Thus, visual patterns may take into account not merely outline but also light and shade and movement, and patterns can be discovered by other senses than vision: a musical tune, for example, is a pattern which is extended in time and which remains the same whatever its key and whatever the instrument on which it is played. As I have pointed out (Brain, 1950 ) the recognition of words in speech involves an identical physiological process. We recognize a pattern which underlies all the auditory stimuli involved in uttering a particular word, though from a physical point of view and even from the point of view of stimuli which they produce in the auditory cortex they must in most respects be different from one another. In the same way we recognizesome common patterns in all the visual representations of a single word. And in man we can take the process much further, for not only is there such a pattern through which we recognize a word we hear and another pattern through which we recognize a word we see, but these in turn must submit to a similar process at a higher level by which we reach a conception of the word as an element in thought and words again are grouped into the patterns which constitute sentences which underlie propositional speech, and it would seem that abstract thought itself need only involve the same physiological process at a higher level and in greater complexity.
The Cerebral Basis of Feeling
The link between feeling and representation is reflected in the impossibility of making a complete physiological and anatomical distinction between the functions of the cortex and those of the diencephalon. Nevertheless, I think that Head and Holmes (1920) were right in maintaining that the conscious experiences which we call feelings are correlated with the diencephalic nuclei, particularly the optic thalamus, in the sense that we experience feelings when nervous impulses reach these parts of thebrain.
Is the localization of pain a function of the optic thalamus? The experimental work of Dusser de Barenne (1935) has revealed a previously unsuspected intricacy in the thalamus including the bilateral representation of cutaneous sensation in each thalamus, and points to what he calls "the high level of functional integration attained in thalamic activity". It seems likely that a considerable degree of pain-localization occurs in the thalamus though the sensory cortex probably contributes greatly to theaccuracy with which the site of the painful stimulus is recognized.
The Biology of Consciousness Whether or not the behaviour of any organism which possesses a nervous system can be explained entirely in terms of reflex action, there can be no doubt that organismswith the most primitive types of nervous system exhibit mainly the ch4racteristics which we have come to associate with the simpler types of reflex action, similar in essentials to those studied by Sherrington in the spinal cord of the dog. Of these Iwould stress two. The first is the inevitability or automaticity of response. This, of course, does not mean that, the same stimulus always produces exactly the same effect, for the response is modified by the state of the rest of the nervous system at the time at which it is applied, but within these limits the response to the stimulus is automatic. Secondly, both the stimulus and the response are immediate. When we think of such reflexes we picture some kind of stimulus applied directly to the organism, as when salivation is produced by placing meat in a dog's mouth, or theorbicularis oculi contracts on touching the cornea. It is only in the more highlyevolved animals that distance-receptors come to assume importance as reflex channels. In the case of the primitive reflex in the primitive organism the stimulus is immediate in the sense that it is not mediated, that is, it is a direct contact with some part of theanimal's body. The response is similarly immediate or practically so: there is no long delay between the arrival of the stimulus and the reaction of the effector organ, and it is clear that consciousness could add nothing to a reaction which is the inevitableresponse to a stimulus.
One of the great advances in evolution was the development of what Sherrington (1947) has called distance-receptors, that is, the receptors reacting to objects at a distance. The development of distance-receptors had a profound effect upon the organism's relationship not only to space but also to time. If it is to react to objects at a distance, time must enter into the organization of its nervous system in a manner which has no parallel in the more primitive creature which responds automatically to immediate stimuli. The organism which is to react to an object at a distance must initiate a course of action which takes time, whether it is to go in pursuit of it or endeavour to avoid it. No doubt in the lowliest organisms with distance-receptors the times concerned are not very long. Nevertheless, as soon as reactions evolved were organized in time and directed towards objects continuing in time, the nervous system came to possess potentially a type of reaction which was capable of maintaining a specific activity for an indefinitely extended length of time.
How was this done? By the development of new types of nervous function, which, though we consider them separately, are so closely integrated in action that their separation is to some extent an artificial abstraction. The first is feeling, which provides the motive power which sustains our courses of action in time. The time concerned may be short, as when hunger sends us in search of a meal, or indefinitely protracted as when an interest in scientific research determines the activities of a lifetime.
But, feeling is directed towards an object, and if actions are to take time the organism must possess an enduring representation of that object, and here we reach the other new function of the nervous system, the representation of the external world. I do not propose to discuss the philosophical aspects of consciousness, but probably most, if not all, neurologists accept what has been called "physiological idealism". All that we know about the physiology of the conduction of nervous impulses teaches us that perception only occurs when nervous impulses reach the appropriate endstations in the brain, that these nervous impulses are all much alike and that they are quite unlike the physical stimuli whether of light, sound or chemical character which initiate them. Our perceptions, therefore, are largely a product of the activity of our nervous system and they are, as we say, "projected", and perceived as being external to ourselves.
As soon as the nervous system had acquired the power to create representations of the external world the potentiality of memory made its appearance. Learning is within the capacity of extremely primitive organisms and it is certainly possible that it may occur in the absence of any representation of the external world, by some process of facilitation of repeated reactions, but it seems impossible that we should remember something of which we have not previously experienced a representation.
If all perception is a symbolic representation it follows that symbolization is an inherent function of the nervous system, and there is no difficulty in understanding the further step by which a hierarchy of symbolic processes occurs. Thus, all speech and thought which employ symbols to represent perceptual experiences or ideas are merely a further development of the symbolic function of the nervous system.
The Nature of Unconsciousness "Unconscious" is a purely negative term: there is no such thing as unconsciousness, and the lesions or disorders of function which abolish consciousness may well be of different kinds. As Jefferson (1944) says "we need to define unconsciousness, whether traumatic or otherwise, by a new term which designates more pointedly its nature, its pathological status in terms of neurophysiology". If we were to attempt to do this, even in the present state of our knowledge, we should find that several such terms were needed. Even clinical observation alone shows that unconscious patients differ from each other profoundly, a point with which we are all familiar. Not only do they vary in respect of such content of consciousness as may remain, but also in respect of muscle tone, posture, the movements of which they are still capable, the condition of the autonomic nervous system and in many other features. The patient who in an attack ofpetit mal continues to ride a bicycle is in a very different condition from a patient who lies in bed comatose from a lesion in the posterior hypothalamus. To say that both are unconscious is a half-truth which may stifle further enquiry. Penfield and Jasper (1947) have pointed out that whereas the removal of the anterior frontal region has no effect upon consciousness, seizures beginning there abolish it from the very onset, and Jasper and Droogleever-Fortuyn (1947) claim to have reproduced experimentally the electrical phenomena ofpetit mal in cats by stimulating the intralaminar region of the thalamus. Quite different are the states of so-called hypersomnia produced by lesions of the posterior hypothalamus and I agree with Jefferson (1944) that it is desirable to use a term-he has suggested parasomniawhich indicates that this state both resembles and in important aspects differs from normal sleep. Finally both Jefferson and Cairns (1949) have pointed out that unconsciousness may be produced by lesions occupying the posterior fossa and in Atkinson's (1949) account of the symptoms of thrombosis of the anterior inferior cerebellar artery he mentioned unconsciousness or obscuration of consciousness.
In such cases all the evidence suggests that consciousness is impaired primarily as a result of disturbance of function of the brain-stem rather than of any remote effect upon the supratentorial structures. Various suggestions have been made as to the mechanism of the loss of consciousness in some of these cases (Grey Walter, 1947; Martin, 1949; Williams, 1950) . We have still much to learn here, but it looks as though we could already distinguish at least three neurophysiological types of disturbance: (1) petit mal dysrhythmia, possibly associated with a discharge from the medial portion of the thalamus; (2) parasomnia with the disturbance in the posterior hypothalamic region; and (3) a lower brain-stem disorder which, when it is more fully understood, may perhaps throw light upon syncope. There must, of course, be others. Descartes said: "I think, therefore I am," but only a philosopher, surely, would identify thought with existence. As neurologists we should not be surprised that consciousness is most intimately linked with those basal nuclei which made their appearance in the course of evolution millions of years before thought became possible, and since the days of our earliest vertebrate ancestors have sustained the life of the feelings.
